PUBLISHED October 26, 2025
In the study of history, we generally focus on the “what” part and rarely on the “why”. While what is matter-of-fact and harmless, the why is both painful and accusatory. The advantage of hindsight is that it can turn yesterday’s brilliance into today’s blunder and yesterday’s success (or the perception of it) into today’s disaster.
The deviation from an ideology, or the adaptation, is a management decision, but the critical factor is the very nature of the decision-making process and skill. The Afghan problem lies in its turbulent history, geography and the conflict of power – both inside and outside. Ordinary Afghans have hardly had much of a role in the devastation they have endured for so long. The fate of Afghanistan has mostly been decided by external forces. The states that have influenced Afghanistan have their own idiosyncrasies, prejudices, ideologies, beliefs, cultures, economic/military power, national character and political systems.
An examination of the decision-making process of the major powers that influenced Afghanistan reveals how Afghans have been affected. America, for example, behaves like a bull in a china shop, it acts quickly but not always correctly or with foresight. It can win wars quickly but peace slowly (Japan, Angola, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria), while China employs old patience and positional advantages rather than confrontation.
Russia’s decision-making excels in total war, but collapses in complex crises that require consultation and modesty. India’s strategic thought is ancient and its execution crippled when it fails to replace Nehru’s idealism with Chanakya’s Machiavellian thought.
Pakistan, with strategic resilience and actions under duress, as a survival state that remains flexible and adapts to challenges with a core principle of denial, deterrence and diplomacy. Britain’s decision-making reflects strategic modesty – it does not lead from the front, but influence from the flank. Europe is stuck in a legalistic and hesitant mindset. It can bring peace but struggles to project power. Iran, a Shia state, struggles to resist global Shia victimization, while deeply affected by historical awareness of a great empire, but with a siege mentality, tries to survive through improvisation – considers suffering as no failure and patience as part of victory.
The Afghan story is not a failure of observation or action. The powers that be fail in their orientation and assumption. They misunderstand Afghan identity, tribal structure, religious motivation and regional interaction. The core assumption has been that democracy can be imported and stability follows aid, while the West can build a system. However, regional actors, obsessed with short-term gains, saw through this myopic lens. Ironically, the Afghan elite had no ability to learn from changing patronage. In retrospect, intrigue stops at, “What did we do wrong?” rather than “Why did we think it was right in the first place?”
Perhaps this is exactly what Afghanistan needs. It is wrong to claim that Afghanistan has been the graveyard of empires – in fact, it is the collective wisdom and prudence that was buried under the rough stones. Afghans also triumphantly claim that their geography remained unchanged for centuries, but one wonders what the claim is worth when the country and its subjects have been orphaned, desolate and abandoned for centuries.
Its continuing relevance has been to serve as a global battleground to test weapons, validate military strategies, breed extremists, promote proxies, satisfy egos and the illusion of great power control.
Continually vying for power to install preferred – if not pliable – regimes, Afghans have been at the mercy of outside powers without exception from the present. Under such circumstances, there was obviously, and is for the foreseeable future, no chance for Afghans to create any semblance of normalcy, let alone any regional or global relevance. Crushed by deep poverty, sanctions, violence, displacement, the worst human development, hostility with neighbors and plagued by the lowest sense of self-esteem, it has no chance of revival. Expecting it to develop into a decent, responsible and coherent functioning state remains a distant dream, if not a delusion.
Long before it lost its physical domain, Afghanistan had already lost both the narrative and cognitive domains, thanks to the shortsightedness of its own rulers. Today it is not even a minimally functioning state. It has locked itself in a dark room and with it sealed the fate of millions in and around its periphery with no silver lining. When the TTP, its willing ally, plants IEDs to smash innocent Pakistani lives and Pakistan, torn between restraint and fury, hesitantly bombs Afghanistan, it is not just war; its history both mocks and reproduces its oldest tragedy.
Things were bad in the past too, but not as bad. A quick burst of history can shed some light on why we are where we are today. From 1947-1978, Pakistan remained suspicious – for the right reasons – of Afghans about the threat from “Pashtunistan”, with the credible potential of an Indian hand behind it. However, Pakistan avoided confrontation using diplomacy with a desire for deep engagement. Without sporadic skirmishes, Pakistan relied on border control. However, history does not believe that in the same era there had been a consistent desire on both sides to find a lasting solution. A consistent proposal for a confederation between the two states had been on the table for about 30 years with varying intensity.
On 20 October 1954, Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s foreign minister during Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra’s visit, told his American counterpart that the Afghans were eager for a confederation between the two countries, and expressed their willingness to drop the Pushtunistan issue in return. Without ignoring the idea completely, however, Pakistan wanted to take a more modest approach to begin with, including economic and scientific cooperation, such as exporting power from the Warsak Dam to Jalalabad. Iskander Mirza and King Zahir Shah in 1954 took it to the next level, with the former offering King Zahir Shah to be the head of state. But Ayub Khan’s martial law gave the idea a death blow. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who wanted to be buried in Jalalabad, also never opposed the idea. Ayub Khan in 1962 made a loud proposal for a confederation. President Sardar Daoud Khan agreed in principle with ZA Bhutto’s idea of creating a confederation between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran after his coup against King Zahir Shah. Daoud’s government, heavily influenced by pro USSR communist loyalists in his government, feared opposition. Meanwhile, Gen Zia removed ZA Bhutto. President Daoud hinted later in March 1978, during his visit to Pakistan, to announce Afghanistan’s recognition of the Durand Line. However, Gen Zia advised him to postpone his visit to Kabul. USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan changed the whole scenario.
All these leaders, dead against each other and bred on diametrically opposed ideologies, were still pragmatic in finding comfort, if not consensus, in the idea.
The cost of these missed opportunities has been colossal, not only in the destruction of the two states, but in millions of lives lost in recent years that have not yet stopped.
From 1979-1989, Pakistan viewed the Soviet invasion as an existential threat, albeit an opportunity to forge a strategic alliance with Afghanistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The deep spirit of brotherhood helped Afghans fight the USSR by physically contributing jihadist fighters, training, weapons, logistics and hosting refugees. In 1989, the Soviets were expelled across the Amu Darya, but the backlash in the form of militancy in Pakistan and chaos in Afghanistan resulted due to a sudden American withdrawal.
During 1990-2001, another bloody civil war broke out in Afghanistan. Pakistan risked supporting the Taliban by recognizing the regime. It was a short-term gain, but a long-term setback that resulted in post-9/11 isolation and the spread of extremism. From 2001-2021, the US invasion reshaped the region; Pakistan tried to strike the right balance by aiming for the best of both worlds ie. engaging the US while not completely abandoning the Taliban to maintain Afghan influence. Pakistan maintained relevance but had to pay the cost. From August 2021-2025, Pakistan considered itself betrayed when the Afghan Taliban regime turned a deaf ear to control the TTP. The US withdrawal ended 20 years of occupation and left behind a collapsed government and a emboldened Taliban.
The Taliban victory was military, not political – with no experience running the government, no economic foundation, administrative experience or international legitimacy. Foreign aid (≈70% of GDP) disappeared overnight and Afghanistan was left with the paradox of being free from foreign occupation but dependent on foreign aid. Afghans continue to face economic collapse with $9 billion in reserves frozen, 97% Afghans below the poverty line (UNDP), 28 million in need of humanitarian aid (WFP 2024), six million on the brink of famine with one in two children malnourished, women banned from education and work. Ordinary Afghans are trapped in a state without governance, leaving them victims of their rulers’ ideology and world-weariness. Yet, instead of helping the public, the Taliban are still stuck in their so-called jihad mode – something that is ingrained in their muscle memory. Understandably, there is nothing else worthwhile they can do – a dilemma for ordinary Afghans trapped in fear and despair.
During the recent unprecedented turnaround, Pakistan’s patience ran out. The disproportionate use of force by both sides failed to distinguish the two as former companions through some of the turbulent times in history. The Afghan management acted naively by upping the ante, while India, as always, found a godsend to pollute the narrative battle. People on both sides lamented the losses with remorse, except for a few who always run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
The less said the better of the disloyal and ungrateful Afghan mantra, which was deeply hurtful, any community caught in a major conflict that has resulted in large-scale displacement for decades suffers from stress, insecurity and mistrust. Some Afghan refugees acted aggressively, not because of inherent hostility, but as a defense against perceived insecurity. Born and raised in exile, many experience identity dissonance: they neither fully belong to Afghanistan, a place they have never lived in, nor to Pakistan, a country that does not fully accept them.
At no time, in the last 50 years, have ordinary Afghans ever been in control of their destinies. Others, both within and without, chose for them when to live and when to perish. After 50 years, this has not changed – and there is no hope in the distant future either. Yet history is a relentless sculptor, carving out alliances not out of affection but out of necessity. The geography that once condemned Afghanistan to endless invasions and Pakistan to eternal uncertainty may, in our lives or our children’s lives, force a reluctant embrace of both. Neither can really thrive while the other bleeds.
A 2,600-kilometer border doesn’t manage to stop bullets, but it does manage to stop bread. Afghanistan’s isolation will deepen until its rivers, trade routes and markets find access to Pakistan. As exhaustion outweighs ideology and survival overtakes emotion, both will realize that their destinies, however outraged, are intertwined.
The confederation that Daoud and Bhutto once dreamed of and dismissed as idealism will one day rise from the ashes, not as diplomacy, but as coercion. The future of the region will ultimately be shaped by the realization that neighborliness is a blessing and not a curse. When that day comes, the border will still remain, but will serve people on both sides. Peace never comes down, it has to be manufactured, packaged, marketed and sold by the wise on both sides – even to those least willing to buy it.
The author focuses on issues related to geopolitics and national security
