Pakistan is once again facing a sharp increase in militant violence, marking one of the most challenging internal security phases since the peak of terrorist incidents in 2010.
In the years since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, attacks have increased in frequency, coordination and lethality. Yet the more troubling reality is not simply the resurgence of militancy, but the state’s continued reliance on a predominantly kinetic response to what are in reality two very different threats.
Pakistan today is dealing with two separate theaters of violence – each driven by separate motivations, actors and end goals. Treating them through a uniform security lens risks strategic stagnation.
The first theater is centered in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, where militancy is ideologically driven in the name of religion. Groups such as the TTP and the Haqqani network, backed by the Afghan Taliban and transnational actors such as Daesh and remnants of Al-Qaeda affiliate networks, are seeking to grab swathes of land to establish a rigid, exclusive version of a Sunni theocratic state.
The Afghan Taliban’s return to power has changed the operational environment in their favor. Whether through direct support, tolerance or failure to act, the space available to anti-Pakistan militant groups across the border has expanded. The TTP has demonstrated renewed organizational coherence and operational capability, carrying out increasingly sophisticated attacks using weapons left behind by the United States.
The second theater is in the capitals of Balochistan, where the conflict is not religious but political. Baloch insurgent groups frame their struggle around grievances of political marginalization, unequal distribution of resources, lack of provincial autonomy and human rights concerns. Their goals range from greater autonomy within the federation to outright separatism.
These are fundamentally different conflicts. One is ideological and transnational; the other is political and subnationalist. Yet Pakistan’s response to both remains overwhelmingly the same: intelligence-based military operations, increasingly supplemented lately by air power, including reported cross-border attacks against militant sanctuaries.
There is little doubt that such operations have yielded tactical gains. However, tactical success has not translated into lasting stability. Militant violence temporarily subsides, only to reemerge in more adaptive forms. The problem is not the use of force per se; it is excessive dependence on it.
A critical but often overlooked dimension of this challenge is the weakening of Pakistan’s institutional coordination framework. The mandate to integrate and harmonize national counter-terrorism efforts formally rests with the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta). Effective coordination requires neutrality and the ability to align federal and provincial actors without institutional bias.
When coordinating agencies are also participants in the operational domain, issues of turf, ownership and institutional precedence inevitably arise, particularly vis-à-vis civilian federal agencies and provincial response departments.
The result is a fragmented response architecture. Information can be shared, but the policy context remains weak. Provincial counter-terrorism departments, already operating under capacity constraints, lack a consistent national framework to align with, while civilian oversight appears increasingly marginalized. Currently, Pakistan risks continuing with reactive measures rather than a unified national strategy.
Compounding this institutional weakness is the ambiguity surrounding the political framework itself. The revised National Action Plan (NAP), now pursued under the banner of Azm-e-Istehkam, is presented as the central roadmap for counter-terrorism. However, closer examination reveals that it largely consists of broad, abstract goals rather than an action-oriented strategy. It does not clearly specify who is responsible for what, nor does it set time-bound goals or measurable benchmarks.
Without clearly assigned responsibilities and timelines, even well-intentioned policy goals risk remaining aspirational. Indeed, Pakistan has a stated policy direction in the form of the 2024 National Policy on Prevention of Violent Extremism, but lacks an execution framework.
What is needed instead is a truly holistic national policy—one that puts economic security at the center, recognizing that instability, unemployment, and regional disparities create fertile ground for both ideological militancy and political insurgency. This must be complemented by an integrated effort in internal security, social development and foreign policy, especially in the management of relations with Afghanistan. Counter-terrorism cannot succeed in isolation from these broader governmental functions.
In the case of religious militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan is engaged in a war of ideas as much as a war of arms. Groups such as the TTP and Islamic State Khorasan draw strength from narratives of religious legitimacy, anti-state rhetoric and exploitation of government gaps.
Yet the state’s counter-narrative remains weak and fragmented. It is mainly based on the Pyam e Pakistan fatwa, which declares suicide bombings and killing of innocent people as un-Islamic, but is silent on telling the youth that the concept of nation-states and the development of social sectors are in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. The recent use of Fitna al Khawarij and Fitna al Hind labels appears to be a step in the right direction, but the neglected area of madrassa reform still leaves room for radicalization.
In Balochistan, the limitations of a kinetic first approach are even more apparent. Political grievances cannot be resolved solely by force. While security operations can suppress insurgent activity, they do little to address the underlying causes that sustain it. Development initiatives, often presented as solutions, struggle to gain legitimacy when local people feel excluded from decision-making or perceive benefits as externally driven.
The absence of meaningful political dialogue, transparent resource sharing mechanisms and empowered local governance structures continues to widen the trust deficit. As history repeatedly shows, subnationalist insurgencies rarely end without political accommodation.
Recent signs of a more assertive stance, including cross-border attacks in Afghanistan, reflect growing frustration in Pakistan’s security establishment. However, escalation without a parallel diplomatic and political strategy entails significant risks and regional tensions, civilian fallout and further radicalization. More importantly, it does not address the central drivers of militancy, ideology, government deficits and political exclusion.
There is an urgent need for a coherent and holistic counter-terrorism strategy that clearly differentiates between the nature of threats and tailors responses accordingly. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, this means pairing precision security operations with a robust ideological counter-offensive, improved policing and better governance. In Balochistan, it requires a shift from a security-led to a politically-led approach, based on dialogue, inclusion and justice.
At the national level, restoring Nacta’s authority, moving beyond abstract wording in the revised National Action Plan and translating Azm e Istehkam into a time-bound, executable framework are no longer optional but urgent necessities. The choice is now stark: continue to deal with violence through episodic force or confront its causes through a coherent national strategy? Without that shift, the state risks remaining locked in a cycle where tactical victories are repeatedly overtaken by strategic failure.
The author is a former Inspector General of Police (Punjab) and a former caretaker Home Minister of Punjab.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pakinomist.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
