The terrorist acts carried out by entities like TTP and now their equally virulent variants like Ittehad-e-Mujahideen-e-Pakistan (IMP) have continued in a sinusoidal wave ever since the launch of Operation Ghazab Lil Haq.
The latest attacks are a grim reminder of the terror that still haunts the newly merged as well as the settled districts of KP. The impunity and persistence of the attackers reflects their determination and sinister desire to achieve their goals despite suffering heavy losses at the hands of Pakistani LEAs.
Operation Ghazab Lil Haq was the right decision, after a long delay, demonstrating the state’s clarity and determination to tackle terrorism without any ambivalence or ambiguity. However, the reality of the fight against terrorism, which has both internal and external supporters, must be understood through an honest assessment of the underlying causes and enabling factors that support terrorism. Afghanistan, the main source of terrorism, is ruled by a cabal that captured Kabul by gunpoint and does not depend on public opinion or political solution.
The result of this reality is the complacent and uncompromising attitude of the Taliban leadership. Multiple factions within them are constantly jockeying for influence, seeing only one thing eye to eye: amassing more power. The leaven that binds these disparate militant factions is a shared religio-political outlook and a history of fighting together against foreign intruders.
It is for this reason that the Afghan Taliban regime cannot bring itself to confront the fierce mix of terrorist outfits operating in Afghanistan, each negotiating its own agenda. The Afghan Taliban government, meanwhile, is fragmented into several power centers. The ‘Kandahari’ faction, led by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, which combines spiritual as well as temporal power, occupies the traditional seat of governance in Afghanistan in Kandahar, and is the most retrogressive in outlook.
The next faction is the Haqqani group, which includes the Zadran tribal leadership and has influence in eastern and northern regions, including Kabul. The group has greater muscle power and creates its own proxies, such as the IMP, to expand its reach and effectiveness outside of Afghanistan. The third main faction is the National Resistance Front (NRF), which includes the former Northern Alliance, including Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, in addition to a few disgruntled anti-Taliban Pashtuns.
Another power faction, the TTP (Fitna tul Khawarij), operates in eastern Afghanistan, in Paktika, Paktia, Khost and Nangarhar. The reach of the faction and its new rival IMP, with the active help of the Haqqani faction, has now also expanded towards Kunar. Terrorist entities such as Al Qaeda and ISKP are also active in Afghanistan, with the latter having a significant presence in Nangarhar and Kunar. Of late, all these terror outfits have started sharing intelligence and training expertise with each other and act as feeders for each other. The American weapons and ammunition left behind in Afghanistan are being used by these terrorist networks, which are not short of money due to an illegal war economy.
Due to widespread bad governance and an illegal economy, Afghanistan is getting poorer while those in power are getting richer. The individual factions become stronger and gather wealth and military muscle. Completely bereft of diplomatic sense and international obligations, the regime ignores UN resolutions calling for the denial of sanctuaries and support for terrorist networks. Under international isolation, the Taliban regime is engaging in illegal covert aid from countries such as India for proxy warfare against Pakistan.
As the TTP and its leader, Nur Wali Mehsud, drew closer to the Kandahari faction, the Haqqanis created the IMP as a counter force, which now has more suicide bombers than the TTP. Odds and ends like Lashkar-e-Islam and Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s factions are also part of IMP now.
There are certain external and internal realities that Pakistani policy makers must acknowledge. On the external front, it must be understood that the current Afghan rulers are inspired both by their skewed ideology and Afghan irredentism.
Pakistan has lost ground in Afghanistan that needs to be regained, especially in the form of an effective counter-terrorist network. Pakistan’s kinetic response has created some impact, but due to the non-elimination of the top leadership of the TTP, the overall capacity to foment terror remains intact. The TTP and IMP become more active on social media and use mobile phone technology to maximum effect for recruitment, planning and propaganda. This is an area where Pakistan’s cyber response needs significant improvement.
While the LEAs continue to pressure terrorists and their sponsors, the political and diplomatic arms of the state should engage with elements of influence in the Afghan regime to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. All these efforts must continue while keeping regional countries such as China, Iran and the Central Asian states in the loop. There is a possibility of an internecine conflict pitting the Haqqanis (including the IMP) and the NRF against the Kandahari faction.
Internally, the TTP and now the IMP appear to retain the capacity to launch attacks against civilian as well as LEA targets. There are areas where the terrorists find refuge due to their coercive tactics and tribalism as the population is still afraid of them. Pakistan needs a unified national response, with the KP government lending a willing and effective hand to the federal government’s fight against terrorism.
David Galula, the doyen of counterinsurgency, recommends, among other things, strengthening an “active minority” among the people who could fight on behalf of the state and win over more people.
Most importantly, the people of the merged districts deserve the governance and development dividends that were promised when these areas were merged with KP.
The author is a security and defense analyst. He can be found at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pakinomist.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
