Khyber Pakhtunkhwa mines and mineral change proposals 2025 is an update to the 2017 law, with the primary goal of attracting domestic and foreign investment, improving transparency and limiting illegal mining to utilize the province’s huge mineral resources for economic development.
This comprehensive legislation, which is detailed in a recent white paper, relates to management, enforcement and economic development, while prioritizing transparency and environmental responsibility. Definitions have been sharpened and key roles now require qualified mining engineers or geologists chosen on profit. The Court of Appeals, formerly chairman of the Mineral Secretary, will now be led by a former Supreme Court judge to secure unwillingness. New organs, such as Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority and a Mineral Testing Laboratory, aim to attract investors and improve technical supervision.
The 2025 bill expands the range over the province with special provisions for merged districts and subdivisions until December 31, 2030, ensuring a gradual integration that respects local customs. The bill emphasizes transparency through a legally binding online mining -cadasters system, mandates environmental and social protection measures and prioritizes social rights, CSR and local employment.
Similarly, it aims to establish a special miner force to prevent illegal mining and establish an independent mining’s appeal right for fair justice. The special minor strength is an important provision in the bill aimed at enforcing rules and limiting illegal mining. The force is designed to fight illegal mining and stop ‘mafia’ that occupies mineral resources in KP, especially in the merged tribal districts where an estimated 3,500 mines are dormant or unregulated.
It will be a uniformed device with powers to detect fours, make arrests and stop illegal mining, including the seizure of equipment. The strength will operate under KP Mineral Development Authority, a new body proposed in the bill to supervise license, permits and enforcement. A special court for mines and minerals will secure Swift trials within 120 days, supported by dedicated police stations. This contrasts sharply with the law of the law on robust enforcement 2017 and promises a crash on unauthorized activities.
The controversy, which relates to fewer benefits to the local communities, is probably due to various political interpretations of its provisions, especially in merged districts where communities have historically been dependent on mineral resources. The bill in 2025 improves the benefits of communities compared to the 2017 law by prioritizing their access to mineral titles, protecting usual equities and secure environmental restoration.
Through the minimal local content requirements, the law allows mining companies to prioritize local employment, acquire goods and services from nearby companies and invest in community development projects such as schools and health facilities. It also includes a 10% non-contributory-free interest in the province, which generates revenue that can finance regional infrastructure. Contrary to the 2017 law, which lacked explicit mandates, the 2025 -bill ensures that societies, especially in merged districts, are financial benefit through jobs and contracts.
The bill has given rise to political controversy with various critics expressing concern for federal overreaction. One of the controversies relates to section 6 (I) which allows the license authority to not only implement the recommendations of the Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA), but also the proposals of the federal mineral wing. Given that mining is a provincial topic during the 18th amendment, this clause has given rise to concern about federal overreaction to KP’s regulatory and administrative domains.
However, the bill explicitly states that the licensing authority can “implement recommendations from the Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority and can implement proposals from the federal mineral wing in relation to the licensing authority’s powers and functions” (section 6 (i)). This has been framed as a discretionary provision, not a mandatory.
The bill also emphasizes provincial autonomy by requiring the licensing authority to ensure consistency across provinces (section 6 (2)) (d)), which is in accordance with the 18th change of mining of mining to provinces. The Federal Mineral Wing’s role is advisory and its proposal is subject to provincial approval, ensuring that the province retains the ultimate control.
The reconstitution of MIFA according to section 19 has also given rise to controversy. The body, previously composed of seven members, including Minister of Miner and Minerals, is now ready to expand to 14 members, including five provincial ministers. The Bill also allows the MIFA chairman to co-opted any person as a member, a step that critics say open the door to politicization and non-transparent agreements.
It must be clear that the expansion of MIFA to 14 members, including provincial ministers and a federal representative (section 19 (2)), is intended to improve coordination and representation of stakeholders. The inclusion of federal input (clause (L)) is limited to an “invited” member who retains provincial dominance.
The President’s power to CO-OPT members (section 19 (3)) is balanced by the requirement for transparency in MIFA’s annual reports (section 20 (2).
Stakeholders in the private sector have also raised concerns about section 2 (KK), which requires joint ventures with state -owned companies for any large -scale mining project involving capital investments of RS500 million or more.
Critics claim that if this decision is left to the government’s discretion, without a clearly defined partnership relationship or relationship, it will act as a barrier to free market participation and thereby exacerbate investors’ confidence.
It becomes increasingly important to clarify that the requirement for joint ventures with state -owned companies in large -scale mining (capital investments greater than RS500 million) is made clear by the proviso that terms and conditions, including partnership conditions, will be “determined by the government” (section 2 (KK)).
This allows flexibility to negotiate conditions in case in case rather than introducing rigid conditions. The exception for cement factories and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minerals Development and Management Company (Section 46 (6)) indicates targeted applicability, not a blanket barrier to private investment.
Similarly, critics have also claimed about the bill’s treatment of strategic and rare land minerals. These must be defined and notified by the provincial government or on the guidance of the federal mineral wing via MIFA. The lack of clear definitions or fixed criteria in the bill has led to fear that valuable mineral resources may fall under central control.
However, strategic minerals are explicitly listed in Schedule I (Section 9), while rare earth soil minerals are defined as those declared by the provincial government via Gazette review (Section 2 (SSS)). The bill does not provide control to the federal government; Instead, KP retains authority to identify and regulate these minerals (section 27 (2)). MIFA’s role is advisory (section 20 (1) (k)) and the final decisions rest with the provincial government.
Finally, several clauses are expanding additional advisory powers to the federal mineral wing about important operational and financial affairs such as royal styles, pricing formulas, model agreements, the licensing authority’s powers and mining application systems.
Federal Mineral Wing’s advisory role in royal star structures (Section 19 (F)), Price Formulas (Section 19 (G)) and Model Agreements (Section 19 (I)) are contingent on MIFA’s review and recommendations. For example, the royalty rates are prescribed by the provincial government (section 84) and MIFA’s recommendations must adapt to KP’s policies (section 20 (1)). The Mining Cadastre system (section 9) and licensing processes (section 6) are provinced provincially, ensuring that federal input remains non-binding.
The new framework requires the establishment of auction committees at both provincial and district levels to manage transparent and competitive mineral rights. A defined mortgage mechanism that allows mineral title holders to secure funding through their own assets without pledging the mineral title itself.
The bill balances provincial autonomy with pragmatic cooperation, ensuring KP’s control over its mineral resources, while at the same time the structured federal provincial dialogue. It sets a bold vision for sustainable growth. The most important protective measures include discretionary language, transparency mechanisms and provincial supervision. Concerns of federal overreaction or investor barriers are reduced by the Bill’s explicit provisions on provincial discretion and case -specific flexibility.
The author is the information advisor of the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and does not necessarily reflect Pakinomist.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in the news
