An official investigation has not established responsibility for an “astronomical increase” of 240% in the cost of the DASU Vandraft project to $ 6.2 billion on a single unit or individual but pointed numbers on Chinese contractors, WAPDA and Planning Commission.

The committee with three members also accused the local administration of the Kohistan district of a delay in the acquisition of land. It said the costs were increased by RS48 billion due to improved security schemes after two deadly attacks on the Chinese contractors. The impact of the security event was hardly 3.8% in the total cost of the cost.

The report stated that “complex interaction between factors and unforeseen challenges” caused the 10-year delay and RS1.3 trillion or 240% increase in DASU developments project costs for RS1.74 trillion. In dollars, costs were equal to $ 6.2 billion – an unreasonable price tag for a 2,160 megawatt hydroelectric project.

The committee said the Chinese contractor ignored the consultants’ instructions, local administration could not acquire the land in a timely manner, and more importantly, WAPDA was assigned to the building contracts “without ensuring the availability of the land required by the contractors, resulting in delays and inactive requirements”.

The committee failed to determine the responsibility of any of the WAPDA chairmen or any senior officer by name despite the fact that it found that it allocated contracts without having land in hand.

The Planning Commission has been held responsible for underestimating land acquisitions and resettlement problems.

Led by Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal, the central development company on Friday recommended the DASU Hydropower project to approve the Executive Committee for the National Economic Council.

“It is a considered view that the delays in the DASU Hydropower project (phase-1) are the result of a complex interaction of factors,” the results of the three-member committee read.

In December, the government ordered the investigation to identify the causes and resolve responsibility for inability to complete the project after the first audit conducted in the cost of 2019.

The Investigation Committee was led by Civil Engineer Ather Hameed. Among the other members were Syed Ayaz Muhammad Haider, director monitoring of the Ministry of Water Resource and Imran Najam’s procurement expert for the ministry.

The inquiry concluded that the construction delays are exacerbated by unforeseen significant administrative challenges and procedural bottlenecks in the acquisition of land, compensation payment and re -settlement processes “.

Unexpected technical challenges have further distracted the project’s implementation plan. Social issues, including complaints and resistance in society, have, according to the Committee, further slowed down progress.

The study committee also stated that the lack of trouble -free coordination between contractors and consultants, security challenges in the project area and natural causes such as difficult terrain, unforeseen geological conditions and flash rivers have added the delays.

“These questions are connected, which makes it clear that no single stakeholder or entity can be held exclusively responsible,” concluded the investigation committee.

When he was contacted, the ministry secretary Syed Ali Murtaza said the investigation was conducted by Chief Engineering Adviser, who is an independent entity and is intended to make such inquiries.

The secretary also said the investigation committee found that the 85% increase in costs was due to the increase in prices and the remaining 15% was due to changes in the project’s scope and design.

The study committee stated that the success of the project depends on a collaboration method that promotes adaptation and cooperation between the federal government, the provincial government in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, district administration in Kohistan, WAPDA, contractors, consultants and communities.

The query recommended to improve stakeholders’ coordination and streamline compensation and resettlement processes. It also suggested proactively to tackle social problems, especially on 132 kV transmission line and implement a robust management strategy to deal with technical, social and security challenges.

But these are the questions that should have been taken into account in 2014. The project has already been delayed by 10 years to 2029.

The original PC-I, which cost RS486 billion, had been approved in 2014 for the purpose of generating 2,160 MW electricity and the implementation date was 2019. Due to increased soil speed, costs were revised to RS511 billion in October 2019 and the implementation was expanded to June 2024.

The largest civilian worker contractor for Stage-I is M/S China Gezhouba Group Company (CGGC), while surveillance is provided by a joint venture of M/S Nippon Koei from Japan and M/S Dolsar of Turkey in connection with local sub-consumption, including M/S DMC, M/S NDC and M/S PEES, 202 study.

From January, the total physical progress is 23.3%, and the economic increase of 23% indicates the study report on the second audit. The project is mainly funded by the World Bank, local and foreign business banks and through WAPDA Equity. So far, RS317 billion has been spent on the project.

RS1.73 trillion Total costs included RS479 billion interest rates on the loans to be taken to the end of the project.

The World Bank had given $ 517 million and from which until December had been spent $ 385 million. Credit Suisse Bank also delivered a $ 350 million loan. The local bank’s consortium led by M/S Habib Bank Limited also delivered a loan of RS144 billion. Against the original costs of the project.

The World Bank is also ready to pour another expensive loan of $ 1 billion for the project.

Cost Opening

The investigation report has built a comparison of increased costs from RS511 billion to RS1.73 trillion. The civilian works cost from RS224.5 billion to RS771 billion -an increase of RS547 billion or 243%. The electric and mechanical labor costs increased from RS54.3 billion to RS87.3 billion -an increase of RS33 billion or 61%.

The social resettlement costs were increased from RS57.5 billion to RS140.3 billion – an increase of RS82 billion or 144%.

Security costs were raised from RS1.5 billion to RS50 billion -an increase of RS48.2 billion or 3136%. The project has been subjected to two suicide attacks that resulted in killing 15 Chinese citizens and four Pakistanis.

Project management costs were increased from RS13.5 billion upper body 54.4 billion – an increase of RS41 billion or 304%. The consulting firms were increased from RS8.3 billion to RS56.5 billion – an increase of R48.2 billion or 580%. As the quantum of the loan burst, the cost costs do too. Interest costs rose from RS107 billion to RS479 billion – an increase of RS372 billion or 349%.

The conditions were increased from RS44 billion to RS99 billion -an increase of RS55 billion or 124%.

The Investigation Committee said there was a significant delay in the acquisition of the country of 9,875 hectares. But the land cost impact was already included in the first revised project, and that is not the reason for cost -withdrawal in the second audit.

The committee noted that the design of the relocation of 52 kilometers long Karakoram-Motorvej underwent significant changes due to delays and geological relations with soil. However, the committee did not solve the responsibility for ignoring geological conditions at the time of planning only in 2014 and then in 2019 when the project was revised.

The committee identified the valid security as a reason for the delay, but it increased costs by only RS48 billion out of the total additional increase in costs on RS1.27 trillion.

Fastening responsibility

The study committee identified a lack of coordination between the contractor and the engineer. It said there were delays due to “the contractor’s failure to submit activity plans, frequent ignoring the consultant’s instructions, insufficient implementation of resources despite repeated directives and inadequate coordination between the contractor and the Engineer”.

It also said that the contractor’s reports indicated that the resources currently available at each place of work are inadequate to reach the target finish datos.

The committee said the district administration was responsible for acquiring the land that it could not acquire in a timely manner. The committee said the WAPDA awarded the contracts without ensuring the availability of the land required by the contractors, resulting in delays and unemployed requirements.

The slow pace of the local area development program eroded social time and exacerbated local resistance, reflecting a lapse in the WAPDA responsibility for effective social agreement.

“Both WAPDA and the Planning Commission not only underestimated clearly land acquisition and resettlement, but also showed a lack of cognitive approach regarding project planning and planning without significant implementation of land collection and resettlement process”.

The study committee said the Chinese contractor is also responsible for slow progress in the construction of the dam and power plants due to mobilization of insufficient resources.

The committee said that DASU Hydropower Consultant’s ad design and surveillance consultants were responsible for “frequent design changes that highlight deficiencies on the part of the design consultant.

The absence of an approved dedicated PC-I for the acquisition of land, as recommended by the Planning Commission, indicates a political supervision that has contributed to the project delays.