Published August 3rd 2025
Karachi:
Narendra Modi may have believed that May would bring his finest hour. After successively increasing Ante with Pakistan every time militaryity revised Indically illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), his regime had a playbook ready. Pakistan, scapegoating for his own failures in the disputed area, would be “taught a lesson”. So what if the last time had brought down an Indian jet or two – to his right -wing constituency, lessons have definitely been learned, ‘strategic costs’ were required. Pakistan, wrapped with his own questions, political and economic, certainly could not keep up with the doctrine of disproportionate reaction that Modi’s government had so carefully cultivated.
And then India’s military brass was awarded to Carte Blanche and Operation Sindoor was launched. Within a few hours or minutes, it was clear that it would hang like an albatross around the Modi government’s neck.
This week, when India’s parliament restored for its monsoon session, the government was facing its calculation moment. Far from a victory meat, the debate on Operation Sindoor unfolded during a cloud of turmoil. Homemade Minister AMIT Shah doubled and told lawmakers that the terrorists responsible for the Pahagam attack on April 22, which triggered the crisis, had been “neutralized” in a separate mission called Operation Mahadev. But the time of the message, eye -catching in line with the parliamentary session, raised the eyebrows. Was this a genuine update or political theater designed to re -enter the control of the narrative?
Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi, who has shown increasing comfort of playing disturbance, did not buy it. He demanded transparency about the cost of the operation and questioned if the mission had really been successful, India had to rely on external mediation to stop hostilities.
Communicating an end to hostilities and saving South Asia from ‘Nuclear Disaster’ is something that US President Donald Trump has enjoyed taking credit for every visible opportunity in the weeks since Operation Sindoor. To the point, some might wonder if he gets some kind of childish joy by rubbing the modi regime’s nose in the fact that, despite all the nationalist bluster, it was Washington’s call, not Delhi’s directive that drew the curtain on this brink manhip. Trump has cried about it in back-to-back press conferences, hailed the “excellent collaboration” from Pakistan, and everyone except issued a mid-crisis score card where Modi’s government came out as the ruthless actor who needed supervision.
This tale has also not gone unnoticed by India’s comments, many of which begin to ask unpleasant questions about the cost of strategic adventureism in a multipolar world. This was not how Modi’s third period should begin. BJP’s electoral dominance had promised continuity, security and a foreign policy without apologies. Instead, almost two months after the new expression, the headlines are saturated with words such as “escalation”, “de-scaling”, “backchannel” and “restraint.” And while New Delhi insists that Operation Sindoor was a “necessary corrective” for Pakistan’s “intriversance”, the new consensus – also among India’s own national security elite – is that the operation did not deliver anything close to a strategic reset.
More narrative is the new discourse in Indian OP-EDS. Writers who are sympathetic to BJP have turned from triumphant to tactical justification. The more independent, however, is not to draw blows. IN The cordAuthor and analyst Pushparaj Deshades made the contradictions in the government’s own account.
“Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed in parliament that ‘Indian armed forces were given full freedom (operational to attack Pakistan). Yet, this claim was contrary to a former defense Saché that revealed that the Indian Air Force suffered avoidable losses due to political instructions that blocked strikes on Pakistani military installations and air defense systems,’ he wrote. Likewise, Desh Pan, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s claim in Rajya Sabha pointed out that “Pakistan could not cause any damage to the Indian side,” was directly contradicted by India’s Defense Chief (CDS), who confirmed the loss of IAF fighters during clashes with Pakistan. “These, overall, suggest a deliberate attempt from the BJP government to obscure the true costs of the operation, presumably to protect Prime Minister Modi’s strong image,” he concluded.
An editorial in Hindu Struck a similar note: “Narendra Modi -Government’s tight approach seeks to change [what India claims is] Pakistan’s behavior and assures its domestic audience … A demonstrated willingness to use power against Pakistan in the event of a terrorist incident is a final reversal in India’s strategy … But there is no evidence yet that it works, even though there has been breast-tumping around that of the reigning party … The success of this approach is debate. “
The play went ahead and interrogated the government’s conflicting claims: “The government claimed success in meeting its goals of launching a military operation and denying that it had acted under pressure in ending the war. Head of opposition in Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi demanded a pointed reaction to repeated demands from US President Donald Trump that he conveyed the Keasfire, but Prime Minister.
The editor did not choke words in its final assessment: “The [Indian] The government contradicts itself when it says the operation was a success and that it continues … There was a little self -reflection with regard to the lapse that led to the terrorist incident and how and how the government plans to tackle them. “
Outside of India’s borders and increasingly within them, the perception is right now: India gambles on a quick, decisive act of repeating regional dominance and was instead of going back under international supervision, explaining non -verified murder counts and avoiding questions about breaking up its own aircraft. And it’s not just editorial writers who raise the alarm. Retired military officials and political analysts that were once in line with the strategic assertivity of Modi’s vision-seriously questioning the long-term viability of what they call “performance depletion”: The idea of visible, punishing strikes can replace sustainable strategy.
This course correction seems to take place even when official channels try to project confidence. The Ministry of India’s external affairs insists that Operation Sindoor sent an “unmistakable message” and BJP adjusted commentators have tried to refresh the operation as a success precisely because it avoided a wider war. But this handslht is unlikely to last long.
The unanswered question — why initiates an escalating doctrine if it is to be abandoned in the midst of the act under diplomatic pressure gentures now not only through think tanks and news rooms, but also among voters who expected their government to dictate terms and not negotiate ceasefire through foreign capitals.
The irony is bitter. Modi’s strongest allegation of geopolitical heft had always been his ability to adapt nationalist mood with real politics calculation. But this time, Washington and Beijing – both eager to preserve regional stability – seemed more in control of the crisis calendar than Delhi did. And Islamabad, far from being “taught in a lesson”, arose with scored diplomatic points and international credibility strengthened by its restraint and readiness to engaging.
Whether Modi’s Government will learn from this episode is reserving to see. But one thing is already clear: Playbook that brought him to this moment may not be able to carry him much longer. Not without counting on the boundaries of the sight and the growing cost of overreaction.
