- Mamona performs quietly, never touch the internet and delete itself, making it difficult to detect
- A delay of three seconds followed by self -department helps Mamona avoid detection rules
- Ransomware — behavior merges with normal activity, delaying the Security Team’s response
Security scientists track Mamona, a recently identified ransomware tribe that stands out for its downturned design and quiet, local execution.
Experts from Wazuh say this ransomware avoids the usual dependence on command and control servers, and instead chooses an independent approach that slides past tools that depend on network traffic analysis.
It is performed locally on a Windows system as an independent binary file, and this offline behavior exposes a blind spot in conventional defense, forcing a reconsideration of how even the best antivirus and detection systems should work when there is no network.
Self -department and Development Tactics complicate detection
Upon execution, it initiates a three-second delay using a modified Ping command, cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.0.7 -n 3> zero & part /f /q and then self-plains.
This self -department reduces forensic artifacts, making it more difficult for investigators to track or analyze malware after it is run.
Instead of using the popular 127.0.0.1, it uses 127.0.0.7, which helps to bypass detection rules.
This method avoids simple detection patterns and avoids leaving digital tracks that traditional file -based scanners may mark.
It falls a ransom -note entitled Readme.haes.txt and renames affected files with the .haes extension, signaling a successful encryption operation.
Wazuh warns that Malware’s “plug-and-play nature lowers the barrier for cyber criminals, contributing to the wider commoditization of ransomware.”
This shift suggests a need for greater control of what qualifies as the best protection of ransomware, especially when such threats no longer need remote control infrastructure to cause harm.
Wazuh’s approach to detecting Mamona involves integrating SySmon into log-catching and using custom rules to mark specific behavior such as ransom note creation and ping-based delays.
Rule 100901 is targeted at the creation of the file readme.haes.txt, while Rule 100902 confirms the presence of ransomware when both ransom noter activity and delay/self-plain sequence appear together.
These rules help identify indicators that can otherwise escape more general monitoring setups.
To respond to Mamona, before damage is done, Wazuh uses Yara rules and a real-time philary integrity monitoring (FIM) system.
When a suspicious file is added or changed, especially in a user’s downloads folder, Wazuh Active Response module triggers a Yara scan.
This immediate remedy mimics what one would expect from the best DDOS protection strategies that act quickly before a deeper compromise occurs.
As ransomware continues to develop, the best antivirus solutions must also be made, and although no single tool guarantees perfect protection, modular response defenses provide a flexible, developing edge.
