The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Beijing unfolded in a climate with increased regional expectations.
What has long been considered a largely rhetorical platform for Eurasian cooperation is steadily transformed by Beijing and Moscow into something more developmentally oriented.
At the meeting, China’s management announced steps to establish a SCO development bank and promised a new line of credit and soft loans spread over the next three years.
The amount may not be impressive in global economic terms, but for Member States facing financial distress, including Pakistan, the message was unmistakable: This forum will not only discuss security and multipolarity, but also begin to channel funds and investments in specific projects.
For Islamabad, this promise comes in a moment when breathing is scarce and every dollar counts.
The summit was also remarkable for the contrast in tone between the addresses of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
Modi, which appeared in China for the first time since the violent border disorder in Ladakh in 2020, stuck closely to the themes that India has consistently traveled in such gatherings. He spoke of terrorism as a universal threat, which made it clear that states that support violent networks eventually would have consequences.
He also repeated India’s reservations over cross-border infrastructure corridors that do not respect sovereignty, a blurred reference to the belt and the road initiative and specifically the CPEC adjustment through Gilgit-Baltistan.
Modi used the opportunity to emphasize that India’s preferred model of regional connection lies in Ventures as Chabahar Port Project and International North -South Transport Corridor, which, in Delhi’s opinion, builds trust rather than infringing on disputed borders.
Shehbaz Sharif, on the other hand, repeated the language Beijing has made central to SCO: Respect for territorial integrity, mutual development and inclusive cooperation.
By carefully framing Pakistan’s attitude about sovereignty and at the same time leaning into the promise of deeper industrial, technological and agricultural cooperation, his speech was aimed at neutralizing India’s recurring criticism and Reframe Pakistan as an indispensable partner in The Bloc’s new economic chapter.
In addition to the plenary meat, Sharif’s engagements in Tianjin and Bilateral meet the message that Islamabad wants to transform the second phase of CPEC into a story that is not only of roads and power plants but of skills, factories and innovation.
It was a script designed to throw Pakistan not as a supplicant, but as a willing participant in SCO’s development. Both leaders recognized the same reality in their own way: SCO drives away from his early identity as a security platform and becomes a forum where development, connection and financial support are at the center.
But they diverged sharply about what this should mean. India considers the initiative as risky if it legitimizes projects that violate to the disputed territory, and it insists that security threats such as terrorism must remain the group’s central concern.
Pakistan, on the other hand, considers the new funding and project-based weight as an opportunity to relieve his fiscal burdens, expand CPEC to sectors that generate exports and jobs and get legitimacy as a key corridor mode.
For Islamabad, the week offered a rare convergence of possibilities. With Chinese support, SCO’s proposed lending mechanisms could give Pakistan access to alternatives in addition to its exhausting cycle of IMF negotiations.
Even relatively small lines of credit, if combined with better governance, could jump-start long-lived special economic zones or fund mothernization in agriculture. The real challenge is not in messages, but on delivery. To ensure that purchases are transparent, projects are not politicized, and infrastructure actually produces productivity gains rather than white elephants.
Sharif’s government is now facing the hard task of matching external promises with internal reform.
The approach of India was cautious, but uncompromising. By restoring its well -known attitude that connection cannot be imposed without consent and by prioritizing terrorism, Modi ensured that Delhi’s record remained intact.
Yet, SCO’s consensus culture and its China-led orientation in India’s sharpest concerns are often diluted in final communication. Delhi risked acting as a participant whose voice is registered but not reinforced. Its answer has been to advocate its own corridors – Chabahar and Instc – but the credibility of these projects depends on load streams and schedules, not just top speeches.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (Instc) is a multimodal trade route (combining sea, rail and road) designed to connect India, Iran, Russia, Central Asia and Europe in a shorter, faster and more cost-effective way than traditional maritime routes.
It was first devised in 2000 through an agreement between India, Iran and Russia and later expanded to include more than a dozen Member States, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and others.
Unless India can demonstrate that its preferred routes can deliver faster and cheaper access to Central Asia, the risk of SCO’s economic reversal leaving Delhi more marginal than central. As usual, the policy around the summit was driven by optics. Clips of leaders who stand together exchange short greetings or participate in ceremonial events, attracted disproportionate attention.
Some Indian business celebrated pictures of Modi in conversation with XI and Putin. Some Pakistani channels emphasized Sharif’s presence with the Chinese president of memorials.
But the deeper story was in the speakers and in the President’s financial messages. China reinforced its role as the primary architect of SCO’s new phase, while Pakistan positioned itself as a recipient and partner in this design.
India maintained its principled reservations and ensured that it could not be accused of liberation. What can each country possibly win or lose from this shift? For Pakistan, the potential gain is two -part: Fresh financial obligations that diversify its external options, and diplomatic coverage in a block that reinforces its partnership with China.
The symbolism of being thrown as central to SCO connection is valuable at a time when the domestic pressure is mounted. For India, the risk is not immediate insulation, but gradual erosion of influence.
Its insistence on sovereignty resonates at home and among some external partners, but within a forum where Beijing sets the pace, Moscow is offering and Central Asian states eagerly for investment, India’s objections can act as background noise unless matched with viable alternatives.
In the end, SCO in Beijing emphasized that South Asia’s two rivals play different games on the same stage. Pakistan seeks capital, legitimacy and partnership through CPEC 2.0, while India in principle insists on, sovereignty and caution in security. China, in the meantime, ensures that both arguments must be performed in an arena, it is increasingly dominating.
The result of this competition is not decided by top speeches alone. For Pakistan, success depends on whether external promises are translated into functioning industrial zones, better controlled electricity systems and skills development. For India, it rests on whether its alternative corridors move from plan to functioning trade arteries.
The lesson for Pakistan is to welcome new financing, but remains vigilant over the conditions, even when they are not spelled as explicit as those in IMF programs.
Only when external support is tied to internal reform has Pakistan seen sustainable growth. The lesson for India is that it is inadequate to repeat its red lines; It must prove through real infrastructure and trade that its connection model is more viable than Peking’s.
Both will have to do more than talk if they are to convert the summit to a durable advantage. SCO cannot compete with BRICS or replace Western financial institutions, but it has grown its reputation as a pure photo-up. It will be a forum where resources, politics and strategy cross just enough to shape results.
Pakistan left Beijing with promises of money and aura for partnership. India has a repetition of principles that protect its red lines but not form the trajectory of the block.
In the changing geometry of Eurasia, it seems that one neighbor has been given little room to maneuver, the other a reminder of its limitations. However, both determine their height through the work they do at home.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and does not necessarily reflect Pakinomist.tv’s editorial policy.
The author has a Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham, UK. He posts @Naazirmahmood and can be reached at:[email protected]
Originally published in the news
