The ink was barely dry on the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) when it ran into difficulties – a painful reminder that peace between the two sides is inherently fragile, always a bullet away from falling apart, and that the strait is likely to remain a sticking point for a long-term détente between Washington and Tehran.
Shortly after the US attack on Iran, President Donald Trump said in a social media post that it was “very possible” that Tehran would “never learn”.
The Islamabad MoU is a preliminary agreement under which Iran and the United States will negotiate and conclude a final treaty within 60 days (the deadline may be extended), which must be approved by a binding resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
From Tehran’s point of view, the most important provision of the MoU is that the US will end “all types” of sanctions against Iran. The language here is categorical, without reservation. Until the sanctions are lifted, Washington will grant waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products. The United States will also release the frozen and restricted Iranian funds and, in cooperation with regional partners (the Gulf states), introduce a $300 billion plan for the economic reconstruction of Iran.
In return, Iran must “not acquire or develop nuclear weapons”. The language here is equally categorical. Iran’s stockpiled enriched uranium will be disposed of in a manner agreed upon by the two countries as part of the final deal. Until then, Iran will maintain the current status of its nuclear program and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran; nor will it deploy additional forces in the region.
The MoU prohibits the use or threat of use of force by the two parties against each other and obligates them to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, which in recent years has borne the brunt of Israel’s firepower. The US will end the naval blockade of Iran in 30 days, while Iran will make “best efforts” to lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and allow free passage of commercial cargo for 60 days. The future administration of the strait will be defined through dialogue between Iran and Oman in accordance with applicable international law.
It follows that Iran’s main commitment in the MoU is not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons in return for the lifting of all sanctions from Washington, which over the years have crippled the Iranian economy and oppressed its citizens.
Thus, the memorandum of understanding – should it lead to a final agreement – will be immensely beneficial to both the government and the people of Iran. A final US-Iran treaty would also provide much-needed reassurance to Iran’s Gulf neighbors.
President Donald Trump is being criticized for conceding “too much” to Iran, particularly pledging to end all sanctions against Iran and promising to launch a multibillion-dollar program for the country’s economic reconstruction. That said, critics should keep in mind that Iran’s commitment to the nuclear issue has met Washington’s longstanding demands.
Although Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which only those states that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967 have the right to maintain nuclear weapons, the Americans never trusted that Tehran would honor its NPT commitment. US sanctions against Iran were primarily designed to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power.
In the event that Tehran is as good as its word on the nuclear issue, there is no reason for Washington to continue the sanctions.
Not only that, but the revival of Iran’s economy and its reintegration into international economic and trade regimes will open avenues for the United States in terms of both trade and investment. As the second largest country in the Middle East after Egypt, Iran is a potentially large market for American products.
In particular, Iran’s sanctions-hit civil aviation industry, marred by aging aircraft, presents an attractive prospect for US-based Boeing. Having spent a few years in Tehran, I am familiar with the high preference among Iran’s urban population for Western goods and services.
How does the Islamabad MoU compare to the JCPOA (better known as the Iran nuclear deal), signed by the Obama administration in 2015? In addition to the JCPOA being a final and plurilateral agreement signed by the five de jure nuclear states and the EU with Iran, the two agreements differ on several substantive provisions.
Under the JCPOA, Iran undertook to limit its nuclear program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in such a way that it would not lead to the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.
However, Tehran did not explicitly commit that it would not produce or acquire nuclear weapons. It was primarily for this reason that Trump abandoned the JCPOA in his first term.
The other JCPOA signatories granted Iran relief from some, but not all, of the sanctions. Furthermore, the lifting of sanctions was made conditional on IAEA reports confirming that Iran was complying with its part of the agreement. The United States suspended its secondary sanctions against Iran, but the primary sanctions remained intact.
The secondary sanctions prevented any third country from doing business with Iran’s sanctioned institutions (such as the Central Bank and the Revolutionary Guard) or companies, while the primary sanctions prevented US citizens and US-based companies and institutions from doing business with sanctioned Iranian entities. Since the majority of international transactions use the US dollar, despite the lifting of the secondary sanctions, only a few countries were able to resume normal trade relations with Iran.
The remarkable difference in the content of the two agreements is mainly underpinned by different contexts. The JCPOA was the fruit of extensive negotiations conducted in a peaceful environment. Its text was extensive and its sequenced implementation had to be spread over several years. On the contrary, the Islamabad MoU was born out of a serious crisis – the US-Iran war, which had thrown the international energy trade into a tailspin. To end the war, it was necessary for both sides to make extensive commitments at once through an interim arrangement.
The smooth implementation of the MoU leading to a final agreement will continue to be susceptible to more spoilers. Trump’s occasional shenanigans are just one — and arguably the least important — of these. On top of these potential spoilers is the reaction of Israel and its powerful lobby in Washington, which wants nothing less than complete impoverishment leading to the annihilation of Iran.
In the event that Israel does not respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, or its powerful supporters in Washington prompt the Trump administration to maintain sanctions against Iran, the intended treaty may fall apart after some time. As the resumption of hostilities between the US and Iran shows, the management of the Strait of Hormuz will remain another issue.
The author is an Islamabad-based columnist. He tweets/posts @hussainhzaidi and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pakinomist.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
