Gulf states rely on Pakistan’s role; Islamabad leads regional talks, maintains close Saudi and UAE ties
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif warmly welcomes Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during a meeting in Islamabad. Photo: app
Ever since the US-Israeli war against Iran broke out on February 28, Pakistan’s efforts to promote mediation have been hard to ignore.
The federal government has sent several peace proposals between both capitals, stretched its diplomatic bandwidth to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table, and despite limited success in early April talks in Islamabad, continues to garner significant support from both Iran and the United States in building a consensus on the path to de-escalation.
The value of having no skin in the game
These dynamics merit a deeper understanding of what constitutes Pakistan’s role as a central mediator in the conflict and the drivers that drive it to this status.
First, Islamabad does not carry some of the constraints associated with the Gulf countries and traditional US-focused brokers. For example, Islamabad does not host any US military bases, making it a crucial player in gaining the trust of Tehran, which has attacked Middle Eastern countries, including brokers Oman and Qatar, for their perceived role in facilitating US attacks on the country.
Islamabad maintains this trust by avoiding any kind of military involvement – even tacit support for the United States – that could put it in the line of fire in the current war.
Read more: Mojtaba Khamenei signals new Gulf chapter, urges US to leave Hormuz
On the other hand, Islamabad, as the destination of choice, provides ample geographical security from nuclear conflict flashpoints.
For example, Pakistan is not in close proximity to areas on the immediate periphery of the Strait of Hormuz, where fluctuating tensions between the US and Iran over opening the waterway have sent considerable alarm across Middle Eastern economies.
This matters to US negotiators, who have shown sensitivity to regions that could invite Iranian attacks, and similar threat perceptions for Tehran – which has seen much of its top leadership become targets of unwarranted Israeli-US attacks – make Islamabad a destination that offers greater security and a stronger basis for serious negotiation.
The Gulf countries also view Pakistan’s role with a high degree of confidence. This was evident in the run-up to the first round of the “Islamabad Talks”, when regional heavyweight Saudi Arabia joined Turkey and Egypt to assess the contours of regional security in four-way talks in Islamabad.
Pakistan also maintains very close ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and the leadership has leveraged its multi-vector foreign policy by making time-sensitive visits to countries such as Qatar to gauge the prospects for de-escalation. Pakistan is also among the few countries that have the ear of US President Donald Trump, who has voiced his support for the top leadership.
Energy dependence as a driver of diplomacy
This proximity allows Islamabad to credibly facilitate the vital exchange of competing peace plans for the benefit of the US-Iran negotiations, as well as take into account expectations of a sustained de-escalation scenario seen through the lens of major Gulf partners, including Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.
At the same time, Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Iran – a close neighbor with a history of shared terrorist cooperation and energy ties – makes mediation a matter of strategic value when the economy is already on the margins.
This reality, compounded by growth risks and limited borrowing potential, makes it clear that Pakistan cannot afford to look the other way when drastic energy shocks from the Strait of Hormuz affect global energy prospects as well as domestic energy supplies.
Pakistan imports the majority of its gas from key Gulf countries. The energy factor gives Islamabad’s mediation the added immediacy that is central to seeing the conflict through for its domestic constituency as well.
Pakistan’s ironclad relationship with China is also a positive amplifier. This alignment is reflected in both countries’ “five-point” peace plan, which calls for de-escalation and the resumption of peace talks.
The federal government’s history of opposing unilateral sanctions, firm respect for international law, and refusal to take sides in the Iran-US conflict give its mediation potential the promise of permanence, alignment with UN-backed dialogue principles, and rare credibility in brokering consensus.
It is this practical reading of gradual but sustained peace talks, momentum, geographic constraints, energy drivers and close diplomatic proximity to both Tehran and Washington that gives Islamabad the leverage and stamina to emerge as a key mediator in the US-Iran war.
