In October 2025, Pakistan closed all major western crossings with Afghanistan. Pakistan stated that the closures were necessary due to escalating tensions and TTP-related attacks originating from Afghan territory. The current arrangement does not indicate a return to normal movement in the near future.
The immediate costs of the closure have been borne by traders, transporters, laborers, workers and border communities who depend on cross-border movement for both economic and social reasons.
Border trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is central to the border country’s economy. It begins before the customs gate, in social connections, reputation, family ties, language, credit and pre-existing business relationships. Much of this trading is mediated by trading networks and brokers whose credibility depends on trust. For people living in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the border is more than a political line between the two countries; it is a long-standing socio-economic space.
Anthropologically, areas near borders include communities with ties to both countries – the country in which they live and the country on the other side of the line where they have ethnic, linguistic and kinship ties. The official line between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been shaped by centuries of connection; therefore, trade in the region is not simply a matter of goods passing through official channels. Much of it is also done on credit given the region’s lack of formal banking and credit systems.
Policies relating to the countries bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan make extensive use of concepts such as regulation, security, closure and control. For the border population, however, the border is not only about security, but also a locally embedded economy of subsistence and mobility. It provides jobs for truck drivers, laborers, warehouse staff, loaders, retailers and customs officers. The closure of the border not only affects trade figures, but also disrupts incomes, debt, mobility and daily planning for traders, transport workers and border country households.
Business representatives have often cited an earlier peak of around $2.7 billion in trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan, although this must be treated as a business estimate as published figures vary widely. A 2018 report in ‘Profit’ said bilateral trade had fallen from $2.7 billion to $1.2 billion in about 18 months, while other reports placed the previous peak closer to $2.5 billion. Since then, the trade has fallen significantly. According to the Ministry of Commerce of Afghanistan, reported by Pajhwok, the trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2024 was 2.461 billion dollars and in 2025 it was 1.766 billion dollars.
Pakistan Trade Development Authority’s December 2025 report shows that Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan fell from $754 million in July-December 2024-25 to $336 million in July-December 2025-26. Imports from Afghanistan also fell from $419 million to $239 million during the same period. This means that Pakistan’s recorded merchandise trade with Afghanistan fell from approximately $1.173 billion to $575 million in the first half of 2025-2026.
My fieldwork with traders and transporters shows that many traders involved in the Pak-Afghan trade had homes and strong networks in Kabul. These networks gave traders from Khyber and Peshawar an advantage because they could supply goods to Afghan traders on credit due to the trust between them. My fieldwork with transporters in Karachi reinforces the same point about the importance of these networks.
After the border closure, profits fell sharply, in some cases by more than 50 per cent. The livelihood chain attached to even a truck is far wider than that of the driver alone, as thousands of households depend on the trucking economy indirectly through people such as drivers, assistants, loading dock staff, mechanics, tire dealers, service stations, roadhouses, warehouses, customs clearance agents, brokers and small traders. The effect of a complete stoppage of truck traffic for a certain period does not end with the transport companies. This will have a flow-on effect on the entire industry’s employment structure.
Today, many traders in Peshawar and Karachi remember a time when travel to and from the border was easier and more familiar. They had homes, relatives, land – and contact networks in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar. For the people of this region, the border has always been a common space of passage, trade, kinship and interdependence between the tribal areas and border districts of Balochistan and neighboring Afghanistan.
This is precisely what the current policy does not acknowledge. The government cannot expect to keep borders secure by creating uncertainty in legal trade. While frequent closures may be justified for security reasons, in practice they penalize those who have invested time and money in legal trade for a living: drivers, laborers, petty traders, brokers and families living near the border. In addition, closing legitimate lines of communication creates an environment that leads to the development of informal channels and increases capital outflows.
Trade and security must be treated separately. This does not mean weakening the rules; it means recognizing that legitimate trade cannot survive repeated shutdowns and uncertainty. Pakistan’s approach to Afghanistan should be more economy-centric, but it remains strongly security-centric. A viable border economy will require clear guidelines for opening borders, improved customs regulations, payment systems and consultation with chambers, transport unions, customs brokers and traders from border areas.
Pakistan can manage the Pak-Afghan border more effectively if it sees it not only as a site of state control but also as a conduit for exchange, movement and community connections.
Border communities should not simply be treated as objects of security policy and left to bear the costs of border closure. They should be recognized as economic actors whose participation is essential for sustainable border management and security. Policies should keep formal trade viable rather than forcing it out of regulated systems.
The author is a policy analyst and researcher. He is the author of ‘Pakistan’s Tribal Borderlands’ and can be reached at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Pakinomist.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
